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MAY, 1922 No. 7 
COMPULSORY CONSTRUCTION OF NEW LINES 
OF RAILROAD 
I N the half century of public regulation of railroads in the United States, regulatory legislation has dealt primarily with functions 
incident to the operation of existing enterprises. The basic con-
cept has been that railroad corporations as common carriers have 
voluntarily assumed obligations to the public which the public has 
a right to require to be performed. 
In the beginning the public offered inducements to private cap-
ital to construct railroads in order that undeveloped portions of 
the country might be given transportation facilities. The political 
and economic conditions were such as to make it impracticable to 
provide railroad transportation in any other way. Railroad prop-
erty in the United States is private property devoted to a public 
use, and, except as the superior rights of the public in respect to 
the use are manifested, the usual incidents of private property con-
tinued during the period when the greatest amou,nt of railroad 
mileage was constructed. No one conceived that the public had a 
right to require the construction of new lines of railroad by private 
capital. · 
vVhen, however, private capital had been induced, or had elected, 
to engage itself in enterprises of this public nature, both the state 
and national governments asserted a right to regulate. In general, 
the regulation by the states has been in the exercise of their police 
power, and regulation by the federal government has been a mani-
festation of the national power to regulate interstate commerce.1 
1 The :federal government may also regulate under the war power or 
under the power to establish post offices and post roads. See 20 CoLu11r. I, 
RI:v. 66o. A discussion of these powers is not germane to the present inquiry. 
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The comprehensive schemes cif public regulation of railroad cor-
porations which have been set up by ·both the state and federal 
governments were in essence designed to procure the proper per-
formance of undertakings which, as common carriers, these cor-
porations were held to have assumed, dealing always with these 
common carrier corporations as existing and operating enterprises. 
In one phase of the Transportation Act, 1920, we find a new con-
cept of the rights of the public in respect to railroad corporations. 
We find an assertion by Congress of a power to require these cor-
porations to make capital expenditures for the construction of new 
lines of railroad. This is the provision of the act which authoriz~s 
the Interstate Commerce Commission to order railroad companies 
to extend thei~ lines of railroad.2 
This assertion of power is in the broadest possible terms. The 
statute is not limited to extensions of a few miles, or within a 
specified territory, but under its terms there is no limit to a require-
ment that a railroad of the middle west should extend its lines to 
either the Pacific or Atlantic coasts, or to the Gulf of Mexico, 
except that the extension must be found by the Interstate Commerce 
Commission to be in the interest of public convenience and neces-
sity, and also that the railroad company's ability to "perform its 
duty to the public" will not be impaired. 
If this assertion of power is sustained, it is of the utmost impor-
2 Paragraph 21, Section 402, Transportation Act, 1920 (same paragraph, 
section one, Interstate Commerce Act), provides: 
"The Commission may, after hearing, in a proceeding upon complaint 
or upon its own initiative without complaint, authorize or require by order 
any carrier by railroad subject to this Act, party to such proceeding, to 
provide itself with safe and adequate facilities for performing as a com-
mon carrier its car service as that term is used in this Act, and to extend 
its line or lines: Provided, That no such authorization or order shall be 
made unless the Commission finds, as to such extension, that it is reason-
ably required in the interest of public convenience and necessity, or as to 
such extension or facilities that the expense involved therein will not impair 
the ability of the carrier to perform its duty to the public. Any carrier 
subject to this Act which refuses or neglects to comply with any order of 
the Commission made in the pursuance of this paragraph shall be liable to 
a penalty of $100 for each day during which such refusal or neglect con-
tinues, which shall accrue to the United States and may be recovered in a 
civil action brought by the United States." 
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tance. That the Interstate Commerce Commission will be called 
upon to exercise such power as it may have, now that Congress has -
undertaken to make the delegation, is reasonably certain. At all 
times throughout the development of railroad transportation in this 
country the demands of individuals and localities for new railroad 
construction to satisfy local conditions and desires have been insist-
ent. Where local enterprises have failed to attract capital of the 
larger railroads to projects presented by local promoters, smaller 
corporations have been organized in many cases to undertake the 
construction. The large number of existing short line railroads 
illustrates this. If the Interstate Commerce Commission is now 
possessed of power to require these larger companies to construct 
new lines, it is to be expected that this type of local enterprise will 
turn. to the Commission with its demand for satisfaction of local 
desire by proceedings under the new statute. 
If the power be generally exercised, it would seem to be the 
most drastic encroachment thus far made by common carrier regu-
lation in the United States upon the right of management of rail-
road corporations and upon the property rights of both the cor-
porations and the stockholders. Regardless of the desirability from 
an economic standpoint of new railroad construction in undeveloped 
portions of the country, it must be conceded that the assertion by 
government of power to direct the form and manner of investment 
of private capital is an entirely new concept of public right in respect 
to private property. For the government at public expense to under- -
take to provide public conveniences is one- thing; for the govern-
ment to require construction of new enterprises by private capital 
is another. 
Heretofore our theory of public regulation of common carriers 
has concerned itself with the obligations which these corporations 
have held themselves 'out as undertaking to perform. For lucidity 
of statement and clarity of expression, Mr. Justice Hughes' expo-
sition of this doctrine in Northern Pacific Railroad Company v. 
North Dakota3 cannot be surpassed: 
"The railroad property is private property devoted to a 
public use. As a corporation, the owner is subject to the 
a 236 U. S. 585, at 595. 
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obligations of its charter. As the holder of special fran-
chises, it is subject to the conditions upon which they are 
granted. Aside from specific requirements of this sort, the 
common carrier must discharge the obligations which inhere 
in the nature of its business. It _must supply facilities that 
are reasonably -adequate; it must carry upon _reasonable 
terms; and it rhust serve without unjust discrimination. 
These duties are properly called public duties, and the state 
within the limits of its jurisdiction may enforce them. The 
state may prescribe rules to insure fair remuneration and to 
prevent extortion, to secure substantial equality of treatment 
in like cases, and to promote safety, good _order and con-
venience. 
"But broad as is the power of regulation, the state does 
not enjoy the freedom of an owner. The fact that the 
property is devoted to a public use on certain terms does 
not justify the requirement that it shall be devoted to other 
public purposes, or to the same use on other terms, or the 
imposition of restrictions that are not reasonably concerned 
with the proper conduct of the business according to the 
undertaking which the <:arrier has expressly or impliedly 
assumed. If it has held itself out as a carrier of passengers 
only, it cannot ·he compelled to carry freight. As a carrier 
for hire, it cannot be required to carry persons or goods gra-
tuitously. The case would not be altered by the assertion 
that the public interest demanded such carriage. The public 
interest cannot be invoked as a justification for demands 
which pass the limits of reasonable protection and seek to 
impose upon the carrier and its property burdens that are 
not incident to its engagement." 
Capital expenditures have been required by the public, and the 
requirements upheld by the courts, where they were in the nature 
of police regulations designed to secure adequacy of the service 
which the carrier had undertaken. Also, the railroad corporations, 
as all other citizens, have been held to ·be subject to the police power 
of the states and the general legislative power of the nation in so 
far as the same might be exercised to promote the health, safety, 
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and morals of the people. The speed of trains has been regulated ;4 
electric headlights required,5 and improved modes of heating pas-
senger cars provided.6 So, too, regulations have been upheld which 
have required the abolition of particular grade crossings ;7 the con-
struction of new bridges to permit the proper flowage of water 
through natural water-courses made a part of public drainage 
projects,8 and the employment of additional train men to promote 
safety of operation.9 Railroad corporations serving particular local-
ities have been required to construct and maintain side-tracks for 
the proper dispatch of business.10 But where the requirement con-
cerns matters as to which there has been no specific undertaking 
by the carrier, or where it does not affect the transportation services 
offered by the carrier, it has been held void, even though it might 
be of great convenience to the public. Thus, the state cannot require 
a railroad company to surrender portions of its right of way for 
the location of grain elevators ;11 neither can it order the indiscrim- · 
inate construction of switches and side-tracks ;12 nor can it require 
the construction of track scales, convenient for the public, but not 
essential to the service of transportation offered by the company.13 
Dbctrines of the law of contracts have been applied in construing 
charter obligations with respect to railroad extensions between new 
termini. Where a railroad corporation has accepted a charter and 
franchise rights upon the proviso that it will operate a railroad 
between particular points, it may be required specifically to perform 
the covenant,14 but if the charter of the company simply authorizes 
the railroad corporation, without requiring it, to construct and main-
4 Erb :t· Morasch, 177 U. S. 584 
6 Atlantic Coast Line v. Georgia, 234 U. S. 280. 
G N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. Co. v. New York, 165 U. S. 628. 
7 N. Y. & N. E. R. Co. v. Town of Bristol, 151 U. S. 556. 
8 C., B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 561. · 
9 C., R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Arkansas, 219 U. S. 453. 
1° C. & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Ochs, 249 U. S. 416; Lake Erie & W. R. R. 
Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 249 U. S. 422. 
11 Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U. S. 403. 
l.2 Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Nebraska,- 217 U. S. 196; Oregon R. R. 
& N. Co. v. Fairchild, 224 U. S. 510. 
13 Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 238- U. S. 340; Great Northern 
Ry. Co. v. Cahill, 253 U. S. 71. 
14 U. P. R. R. Co. v. Hall, 91 U. S. 343. 
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tain a railroad to a certain point, the corporation cannot be com-
pelled to extend its rails to the charter limits.15 
The police power of the states has been limited to a regulation 
of the railroad in the form in which the stockholders have created 
it. In applying for public franchises, either primary or secondary,. 
the incorporators were frequently limited by specific requirements. 
Where the express or implied acceptance of these requirements ere• 
ated contractual obligations, the power of the state to enforce them 
is recognized. But the right of the public to regulate the functions 
of the corporation depended, at least in the beginning, upon the 
voluntary assumption by private capital of undertakings of a public 
nature. 
It was recognized that this right of regulation could be asserted 
only within definite limits. 
In Chicago, Milw(f;ukee & St. Paul Railway Company v. Wiscon· 
sin,15" where a state statute requiring the upper berth in sleeping 
cars to be closed when not in use was found unconstitutional, Mr. 
Justice Lamar stated the following limitation upon the power of 
regulation by the states: "The right of the state to regulate public 
carriers in the interest of the public is very great. But that great 
power does not warrant an unreasonable interference with the right 
of management or the taking of the carrier's property without com-
pensation." 
As previously noted, in the N ortli Dakota Lignite case Mr. J us-
tice Hughes limited the right of regulation through the police power 
to duties voluntarily undertaken, saying of a railroad corporation: 
"If it has held itself out as a carrier of passengers only, it cannot 
be compelled to carry freight."16 More direct on the question of 
power in respect to railroad extensions is the following dictum in 
the Oregon Track Connection case, where Mr. Justice Lamar said: 
"Since the decision in Wisconsin, etc., R. R. v. Jacobson, 179 U. S. 
287, there can be no doubt of the power of a state, acting through 
an administrative body, to require railroad companies to make track 
connection. But manifestly that does not mean that a commission 
15 N. P. Ry. Co. v. Dustin, 142 U. S. 492-499; Stat~ v. Sou. Minn. Ry. 
Co., 18 Minn. 40. 
15" 238 U. S. 491, at 501. 
16236 U. S. 585, at 595. 
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may compel them to build branch lines, so as to connect roads 
lying at a distance from each other."17 
It is further well settled that the police power of the state cannot 
require private corporations to continue the operation of a railroad 
at a loss18 unless such operation is a positive requirement of the 
charter or franchise under which the corporation continues to assert 
rights.19 The public right over the corporation's property is limited 
by the use to which the property is devoted. The corporation pos-
sesses the power to change the use in order to avoid confiscation 
of its property. Thus, in the Brooks-Scanlo1i case, Mr. Justice 
Holmes for the court said: "If the plaintiff be taken to have granted 
to the public an interest in the use of the railroad it may withdraw 
its grant by discontinuing the use when that use can be kept up only 
at a loss. "20 
If constitutional guaranties are violated by requiring continued 
railroad operation at a loss, it would seem that they would be vio-
lated by requiring new railroad construction without a definite, 
positive and enforceable guaranty of an adequate return. 
In the only case which has been presented to the highest court 
of a state, the claim of existence of such a power has been denied.21 
The supreme court of California in the case referred to set aside 
an order of the Railroad Commission of that state which required 
the construction of a twelve-mile railroad extension, and stated the 
limits of the police power of the state as follows : 
"The supervision of service rendered by a railroad com-
pany is a proper matter for public regulation and control. 
The question whether a railroad company shall extend its 
lines to points not theretofore reached by it, whether, 0 in 
other words, it shall engage in a new and additional enter-
prise, is one of policy to be determined by its directors. To 
compel a railroad company to apply its property to the con-
11 224 U. S. 510, at 528. 
1 s Brooks-Scanlon Co. v. R. R. Comm., 251 U. S. 396; Bullock v. R. R. 
Comm. of Florida, 254 U. S. 513. 
19 Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 262, 276. 
20 251 U. S. 3!)6, at 399· 
21 A., T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. R. R. Comm., 173 Cal. 577, l6o Pac. 828. 
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struction and operation of a line of railroad which it does 
not desire to construct or operate is to take its property."22 
In arriving at this conclusion the supreme court of California 
discussed the asserted analogy between railroad operation and the 
operation of water and gas companies. As to the latter, require-
ments for extension of service have been upheld by the courts. The 
differentiation which the California court suggests seems to be 
sound; that is, that the local public utilities are operated under a 
monopolistic franchise and that in undertaking to exercise their 
franchise monopolies these companies are held to have undertaken 
to furnish adequate service within the territorial limits of their 
monopoly. As to them, it is held that a required extension does 
not constitute a taking of their property without due process of 
- law. Clearly there is a distinction between the character of under-
taking which private capital assumes when it secures a monopolistic 
franchise to serve a particular locality to the exclusion of all others, 
and the undertaking which private capital assumes in respect to the 
construction of a railroad as to which the clear intent of all laws, 
both state and federal, has been to preserve and foster competition. 
It may be suggested in connection with a discussion of the police 
power of the state, as outlined by the supreme court of California, 
that statutes of the states and orders of regulatory bodies have been 
upheld where they have required the compulsory construction of 
side-tracks. A distinction exists, however, between the construction 
of a side-track, which is in effect the making adequate of terminal 
facilities in a particular place which a railroad company has under-
taken to furnish, and the extension of a new line of railroad between 
points which the railroad company has not undertaken to serve. 
\vhile the decision of the California court is finally placed upon 
the interpretation of the particular statute involved, the discussion 
of constitutional power is in line with the previously recognized 
limitations upon the police power of the state. Nor does it appear 
probable that the courts would view any more favorably an effort 
to sustain orders for railroad e..'\:tensions by reference to the so-called 
reserve power over corporate charters. 
The reserve power of the states with respect to the amendment, 
22 173 Cal. 577; 16o Pac. 828, at 832. 
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alteration and repeal of corporate charters, which came into vogue 
following the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States 
in the Dartmouth College case,23 is itself subject to the prohibition 
of the Fourteenth Amendment against taking property without due 
process of law.24 
Further than this, it is has been held that not only is the state 
prevented from the taking of property without due process of law 
under the guise of amending a corporate charter, but that it cannot 
under this reservation of power prescribe amendments to existing 
charters which will change the nature of the corporation in such a 
way as to impair the rights of minority stockholders. Thus, where 
a legislature undertook by subsequent statute to authorize all rail~ 
road companies to lease their railroads, a lease of a railroad pr~ 
viously chartered was held void on the ground that the corporate 
business could not be radically changed by the majority, even with 
the consent of the legislature.20 Under this principle that the state 
could not enact fundamental amendments without consent of .the 
majority of the stockholders, it has been held that a state cannot · 
authorize one railroad to consolidate with another, 26 or authori~e a 
change in the nature of the enterprise,27 a change of termini,28 a 
change in the .method of voting stock,29 or a change of the route by 
a railroad company.30 
If the states are impotent under their police power to require the 
building of new lines of railroad, no reason suggests itself for an 
assumption that the federal power under the commerce clause is 
broader iii its application to the rights of private property. It has 
been decided that the prohibition against the taking of property 
without due process of law in the Fifth and Fourteenth amend-
ments to the federal Constitution is to be construed in the same 
23 Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518. 
24Miller v. New York, 15 Wall. 478; 'Shields v. Ohio, 95 U. S. 319; 
Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U. S. 700; Greenwood v. Union Frt. Co., 105 U. S. 13. 
2s Mills v. R. R., 41 N. J. Eq. l; Dow v. Nor. R. R., 67 N. H. 1. 
2e Clearwater v. Meredith, l Wallace 25. 
27 Black v. Canal Co., 24 N. J. Eq. 455. 
28 Manheim Co. v. Arndt, 31 Pa. St. 317. 
20 State v. Greer, 78 Mo. 188; Zabriskie v. Hackensack R. Co., 18 N. J. 
Eq. 178. 
30 Kenosha, etc., R. R. Co. v. Marsh, 17 Wis. 13. 
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manner in each amendment.31 In this connection it is pertinent to 
observe the rather graphically stated concept of limitation upon the 
federal power which the Supreme Court of the United States, speak-
ing through Mr. Justic~ Brewer, announced fourteen years ago: 
"It must be remembered that railroads, are the private property of 
their owners; that while from the public character of the work in 
which they are engaged the public has the power to prescribe rules 
for securing faithful and efficient service and equality between 
shippers and communities, yet in no proper sense is the public a 
general manager."32 
This analysis of these powers of the state and federal agencies 
leads to the conclusion that as to neither does the right of the gov-
ernment under our constitutional scheme contemplate the require-
ment that private capital shall be invested in new enterprises of a 
public nature without the consent of its owners. But even if the 
courts should incline toward sustaining the exercise of the. power 
to require new railroad construction at the expense of private cap-
ital, there is further question whether, even under such a view of 
the law, the present statute, wherein Congress has sought to exercise 
this right, could in any event constitute a valid exercise of ~ower. 
The present statute, set forth in full in a foot-note on an earlier 
page, provides that the Commission, after a hearing, may order 
any carrier by railroad "to extend its line or lines." The only lim- · 
itations placed upon this broad delegation of power are: (a) that 
no such order be made unless the Commission finds the extension 
to be "reasonably required in the interest of public convenience and 
necessity," or (b) ''that the expense involved therein will not impair 
the ability of the carrier to perform its duty to the public." 
It will doubtless be urged by supporters of the validity of the 
statute that the disjunctive "or," making the limitations alternative, 
should be construed as "and." Thus construed, both types of lim-
itation would be operative as conditions precedent to the exercise 
of power. Neither limitation, however, undertakes to protect the 
carrier corporation's rights in its own funds or property, or under-
at Twining v. New Jersey, 2n U. S. 78, at 101. 
112 Interstate Commerce Commission v. C. G. W. R. R. Co., 209 U. S. 
108, at u8. 
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takes to offer any compensation for the "taking" which the statute 
contemplates. 
That there is a "taking of property" when an additional line of 
railroad is ordered to be constructed can scarcely be controverted, 
for such an order requires the corporation to expend its capital in 
a particular way. It has been held by the Supreme Court that a 
requirement that a railroad company should make track connec-
tions, 33 or install track scales.,34 constituted a "taking of property, 
since it compelled the defendant to expend money and prevented it 
from using for other purposes the land on which the tracks were 
to be laid."36 
It may be urged that whether or not the "taking'' would be unrea-
sonable or would deprive the corporation of a reasonable return 
upon investment would depend. upon the facts in a particular case 
and the kind of order which the Commission might make. As a 
practical matter, however, there are few instances of a new railroad 
construction which can ever be assumed to be profitable from the 
beginning, and it is almost inconceivable that an order requiring 
new construction could ever be made under such circumstances that 
the Commission could find, or that the courts could sustain a find-
ing, that the returns from operation would immediately be such as 
to make the venture a lucrative one from the standpoint of invest-
ment. 
In this connection it is pertinent to observe that the principal 
demands for new lines of railroad are for lines of railroad wholly 
within the confines of a single state. As to such lines of .railroad 
the Interstate Commerce Commission could scarcely undertake :to 
make a competent finding as to the profitable nature of the under-
taking, because Congress has left the rate-making power as to intra-
state rates and fares in the hands of the states, except as unjust 
discrimination may result against interstate commerce. The great 
preponderance of local traffic on new lines of railroad is intrastate 
in character, and it is therefore an anomalous thing for the federal 
government to assert the right to require the building of new lines 
33 O. W. R. R. & N. Co. v. Fairchild, 224 U. S. 510. 
34 Great Northern Railway Co. v. Minnesota, 238 U. S. 340. 
au 224 U. S. 510, at 523. 
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of railroad without at the same time asserti1;1g the power to control 
the entire income of such lines. 
It is further <foubtfuL whqt effect, if any, co~ld be given to a 
:(inding by the Commissiqn of probable future profit, in the light 
of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United State$ dealing 
w~th the construction of side-tracks to grain elevators in Nebraska, 
wher~ the court declared a statute of N ebras~a unconstitutional in 
that jt did not prqvide compensation to tlie railro<:i.d company for 
its required outlay, and M.r. Justice Holmes for the court said: "To 
require the company to incur this expense unquestionably does take 
its property, whatever may be the speculation as to the ultimate 
return for the outla,y."36 
Another infirmity of the present statute is that it contemplates 
an order of the Commission requiring railroad <:onstruction upon 
property not owned by the carrier corporation, without clothing the 
corporation with any power of eminent domain whereby it might 
acquire the necessary right of way. Railroad corporations as char-
tered by the several states are generally given certain powers of con-
demnation within their charter limits by the state sovereignties. But 
tl].e power of eminent domain granted by a state can be exercised 
only in conformity with the particular conditions of the grant and 
is not to be implied. 860 None of these conditions now existing con-
templates or authorizes the exercise by the carrier of the power of 
eminent domain to effectuate an order of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission. In fact, it has been held under particular statutes 
that the power of eminent domain granted by the state is exhausted 
when it has once been exercised in the original construction of a 
raikoad, and that it cannot again be exercised without further stat-
utory authority.s7 
The federal statute does not undertake to impose any legal duty 
upon the land owner to surrender his land for railroad right of way 
in the event that the Interstate Commerce Commission should order 
railroad construction across his premises. The railroad corporation 
36 Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v. Nebraska, 217 U. S. 196, 205. 
36 .. Richmond v. Southern Bell T. & T. Co., 174 U: S. 761; Hooe v. 
United States, 218 U. S. 322. 
137 Cairo, V. & c, Ry. Co. v. Woodyard, 226 Ill. 331~ 8o N. E. 882; C., B. 
& Q. R. R. Co. v. Cavanagh, 278 Ill. 6og; n6 N. E. 128. 
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is given no federal right to force such a surrender. Thus an order 
of the Interstate Commerce Commission in a particular case might 
well be impossible of execution. In many cases it would be void 
not only as an interference with the property rights of the railroad 
corporation, but with the property rights of individual land owners 
-at least until Congress, by appropriate statutory enactment, should 
undertake to subject their property to the power of eminent domain. 
The second alternative limitation in the statute to which we have 
referred-that is, that the Interstate Conunerce Commission is not 
to make an order which will interfere with "the carrier's ability to 
perform its duty to the public,"-is so vague and indefinite as to 
add substantially nothing to the validity of the statute, unless it is 
susceptible of a construction which in effect would negative any 
possibility whatever of any order for the extension of a railroad 
being made. If it be said that the "duty to the public" to which the 
statute refers is the duty to improve and maintain existing lines of 
railroad, to purchase new equipment, and to enlarge present termi-
nal facilities so as to promote the expeditious handling of business, 
then any order of the Commission which would require the use of 
property in any other way would "impair the ability of the carrier 
to perform its duty to the public." In this view of the law this 
proviso, as a practical matter, would nullify any order of the Com- · 
mission acting under this statute. In any event, it cannot be urged 
that this limitation upon the Commission's authority serves to sat-
isfy the requirements of the federal Constitution in respect to the 
taking and use of private property for a public use. 
It may be asked, in the light of these criticisms and suggestions, 
what the legislative intent of Congress was in enacting the statute. 
The legislative history is not illuminating. In spite of the sweeping 
nature of the statute, the discussion in Congress, either on the floor 
or in the committee reports, is so meager as to indicate that but 
little consideration was given to this part of the law. The provision 
\vas originally in the bill as it passed the House of Representatives, 
and was incorporated in the final bill enacted into law by the con-
ference committee of the House and the Senate. Even in the synop-
sis of the bill by paragraphs, as presented in the report of the Com-
mittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce of the House of Rep-
resentatives, the new declaration of power is given scant considera-
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tion, the only sentence referring to it being the following: "The 
Commission is also given power, after hearing, to require a railroad 
to provide itself with safe and adequate facilities for performing 
its car service and to extend its line, if the Commission finds that 
this is required in the interest of public convenience and necessity 
and will not impair the ability of the carrier to perform its duty to 
the pµblic." 38 
The probable reason for this scant consideration is that the pro-
vision seems to be adopted as a supposed concomitant to other para-
graphs of the same section of the Transportation Act, contempo-
raneously enacted, which prohibited the building of extensions of 
new lines of railroad without first obtaining a certificate of present 
or future public convenience and necessity. 
In paragraph 18 of section 402, Transportation Act, r920, Con-
gress undertook for the first time to restrict the building of new 
lines of railroad upon the theory, as expressed by the committee 
reports, that such restriction would tend to stabilize existing condi-
tions and prevent the construction of unnecessary lines of railroad 
which, as stated by the committee of the House, "without any rea-
sonable hope of profitable operation, would become a burden upon 
the public.''39 
38 Report No. 456, House of Representatives, 66th Congress, First Ses-
sion, page 28. 
30 '!'he Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce of the House 
of Representatives presented its views upon this proviso of the law in its 
committee report as follows : 
"Section 402 further provides that extensions of an existing railroad 
or the construction of a new line or the abandonment of a line shall not 
be premitted unless and until there shall have been obtained from the com-
mission a certificate that the present or future public convenience and 
necessity require or will require such construction or abandonment. A like 
provision can be found in the statutes of a number of states. Your com-
mittee believes that the requirement of such a certificate, so far as extensions 
are concerned, will tend to stabilize existing conditions and prevent the con-
struction of unnecessary or parallel lines which, without any reas.onable 
hope of profitable operation, would become a burden to the public. A sim-
ilar provision in the laws of several states has proved successful in pre-
venting the construction of weak lines. '!'his provision of the bill, however, 
does not extend to the construction or abandonment of side tracks, or of 
spur, industrial, team or switching tracks, or of street car and electric sub-
urban lines, if such tracks or lines are located or are to be located wholly 
within one state." 
COMPULSORY RAILROAD CONSTRUCTION 713 
It is to be recalled that in other sections of the Transportation 
Act Congress had directed the Commission to enact rates so as to 
provide a net return on the aggregate value of the property of car-
riers in groups upon such percentage as the Commission might deter-
mine to constitute a fair rate of return.40 
Congress undertook to deal with the aggregate value of railroad 
property in groups to avoid the so-called "problems of the weak 
lines." It was urged that some lines of railroad should never have 
been built, in that they were unwisely located, were unnecessary in 
the interest of the general public, and represented a burden on the 
public for their continued maintenance without corresponding 
benefits. 
Congress did not guarantee any particular railroad a rate of 
return, but dealt with the general level of rates in the expectation 
that this would result in adequate transportation for the public. 
The weak lines, which under no conceivable competitive rate struc-
ture could ever earn a fair rate of return on investment or value, 
presented a difficult problem. Quite naturally, Congress enacted 
the prohibition against the construction of more lines of railroad 
of this character until a national agency should have approved of 
the public convenience and necessity. Such restriction upon capital 
seeking to engage in ventures of a public nature has frequently 
been upheld when exercised by the states.41 
But it is one thing to restrict private capital from investment in 
enterprise of a public nature, and quite another thing to require 
that capital should be so invested regardless of the desires of its 
owners. In the former case the state simply declines to permit the 
exercise of franchises of a quasi public character until certain con-
ditions shall have been met. In the latter case the state quite effec-
tively "takes" the property of a private corporation, interferes with 
the right of management, and negatives the contractual rights of 
stockholders in the corporate property. 
40 For the two years following the passage of the Act, Congress pro-
vided that the rate of return should be 5~ per cent, with an optional addi-
tion of one-half of one per cent for additions and betterments. Transpor-
tation Act, Section 422; Interstate Commerce Act, Section 15a. 
41 Milford, etc., R. R. Co. Petition, 68 N. H. 570, 36 Atl. 545; People v. 
R. R. Commission, 16o N. Y. 202, 54 N. E. 697; People v. Public Service 
Commission, 227 N. Y. 248, 125 N. E. 438. 
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Wholly aside from these legal aspects of the problem involved, 
and even more vital to the future of private railroad operation in 
this country, are the economic aspects. In the past the conduct of 
common carrier service by private capital has been entirely permis-
sive. Regulations imposed have had to do with the protection of 
the public within the undertakings voluntarily assumed by private 
capital with the permission of the public. _ It has always been 
assumed that the only alternative to private undertaking was the 
performance of public service at public expense. It has been long 
supposed that until the government, state or federal, undertakes to 
provide public utility, service at public expense, private property 
cannot be deprived of its right to a fair return upon capital invested 
in such enterprises or its right to withhold capital from such under-
takings. 
If, however, capital once invested in ·common carrier service is 
impressed with a public use, not only within the confines of original 
undertaking, but to a -continued use in providing extensions of the 
enterprise under public direction, we have materially enlarged upon 
the original concept. From a practical standpoint, little good could 
result from such a view. Returns upon private capital invested in 
railroad properties have not been so satisfactory to the investors 
in recent years as to make them welcome new obligations not fore-
seen at the time of the original undertaldng. If the concept of pub-
lic right is to be enlarged we may well conceive that, in so far as 
possible, private capital will withdraw itself from the hazard of 
such undertakings. This unquestionably is not in the public interest 
as expressed in the more vital and constructive portions of the legis-
lation recently enacted by Congress. 
Neither of two decisions of the Supreme Court construing parts 
of the Transportation Act, rendered since the preparation of this 
article, bear materially upon the proposition which we have dis-
cussed. In Railroad Commission of Wisconsin et al. v. C., B. & 
Q. R. R. Co., decided February 27, 1922, the court upheld orders 
of the Interstate Commerce Commission prescribing state-wide 
schedules of intrastate rates as a proper application of the pro-
visions of paragraph 4, section 13, Interstate Commerce Act, in 
respect to removing discriminations against interstate commerce. 
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In State of Texas v. Eastern Texas Railroad Company et al., 
decided March 13, 1922, the court held that the Transportation Act 
did not sustain the Interstate Commerce Commission in its author-
ization to the Eastern Texas Railroad Company, a Texas corpora-
tion, to abandon a part of its railroad as to intrastate business. 
Neither decision, therefore, touches upon the right of Congress to 
require capital expenditure for new undertakings. 
Chicago, Illinois. KENNE'rH F. BURGESS 
